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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a Decree of Abandonment and 
order denying the Appellant's Motion to Amend Findings and 
Judgment or in the Alternative for a New Trial. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE 
BY LOWER COURT 
Judgnent was entered on February 22, 1980, in favor 
of Respondents on the abandonment issue joined in the pleadings. 
Appellant moved to amend the findings, conclusions and decree or, 
alternatively, to open the judgment for the taking of additional 
testimony, or for a new trial. The motion was based upon the 
following grounds: (1) the absence of findings regarding the 
credibility of Appellant and his witnesses; (2) Appellant's 
inability to present certain testimonial evidence at trial; and 
(3) the insufficiency of the evidence to justify the decision. 
Oral argument on the motion was heard by the trial court, and 
its order denying the same was entered, on April 16, 1980. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have this Court substitute its 
discretion and view of the testimonial record for that of the 
trial court, or in the alternative, to remand the case for 
further evidentiary proceedings to permit Appellant to more fully 
develop and present his case. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's statement of facts consists principally of 
allegations and conclusions unsupported by the record, and fails 
the requirement of the appellate rules of this Court, i.e., that 
the substantial facts supporting the ruling of the trial court 
must be fully and fairly set forth. Accordingly, Respondents 
find it necessary to make an accurate and complete statement of 
material facts. 
The Trial 
Following her divorce from Appellant in January 1970, 
(R. 7 and Ex. P-1), Respondent Nadine McKinstray Suesserman and 
her two children, Melody and Peter, resided with her parents, 
the McGuires, in Jackson, Wyoming (R. 61). The McKinstray and 
McGuire families had been residents of the small town of Jackson 
for many years, 37 and 20 years respectively (R. 64, 177). The 
two families' homes were only one-half mile apart in the same 
residential section of town (R. 70) ; Nadine and Appellant had 
attended high school together (R. 69); and, the families were 
well known to each other (R. 72). Except for the brief period 
between late December, 1972, and February, 1973, while they 
accompanied their mother on a trip to Ontario, California, the 
children resided continuously at the McGuire home until September, 
1973, at which time Nadine moved with them to Denver, Colorado 
(R. 62, 73). 
Prior to his last contact with the children near Easter 
-2-
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1973, Appellant had always arranged visitations by telephoning 
the McGuire home (R. 63). Communicating with his ex-wife was 
difficult, but he was on speaking terms with her mother (R. 213) 
and was never denied the right to visit with the children (R. 330). 
Appellant remarried in October 1971; his second wife recalled 
his experiencing no difficulty having visitation (R. 162). The 
McKinstray grandparents also visited with Melody and Peter, usually 
on their birthdays (R. 92). 
After 1970, Appellant's child support payments were 
made with increasing irregularity, and by late September 1972, 
he was almost eleven months in arrears (Ex. R-2). The arrearage 
situation precipitated visitation problems which strained relations 
between the two families to the point that Mrs. McGuire and Mrs. 
McKinstray argued in November 1972 (R. 186, 187). Mrs. McKinstray, 
having "made up her mind", never visited with the children again 
(R. 188). She did, however, engage her son's divorce counsel in 
early 1973 to obtain Nadine's Ontario; California, address via 
the Teton County court clerk's office for the ostensible purpose 
of forwarding the children's late Christmas presents and a 
February birthday gift for Melody (R. 181; Ex~ R-4, R-5 and R-12). 
Counsel's letter to Nadine addressed to her parents' post office 
box number (Ex. R-5), an address she had used ever since the 
divorce and continued to use as a forwarding address until her 
parents moved from Jackson in 1978 (R. 91), reached her in due 
course and she supplied her California address without hesitance 
(R. 82). The presents were not mailed, however, and although 
-3-
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Nadine, Melody and Peter moved back to the McGuires' home in 
Jackson shortly thereafter -- which Mrs. McKinstray knew (R. 189) 
-- the presents were never delivered (R. 179; Ex. R-15, R-16, 
R-17 and R-18). 
After Nadine moved back to Jackson from California, 
she could not agree on visitation terms with Appellant, so he 
determined to visit the children at their elementary school 
(R. 214-216). That school visit, near Easter 1973, was the 
last contact or communication Appellant ever had with his child-
ren (R. 75, 91 and 216). Likewise, he made no child support 
payments after April 23, 1973 (Ex. R-2). Sometime after that 
Easter 1973, visit Appellant stated to his wife regarding what 
he felt ". . . for not having his kids" that it • he didn •· t 
want any more kids. He didntt want to go through this pain any 
more. He just didn't want no part of it". (R. 171). Appellant 
made no further requests to visit with the children during the 
summer of 1973, and Nadine moved with them to Denver, Colorado 
in September of that year (R. 68). Ten months later, Nadine 
and the children moved to St. Louis, Missouri, and then to Salt 
Lake City, Utah, in the fall of 1979 (R. 73). 
In each of the years 1974 through 1977, Melody and 
Peter returned to Jackson to vacation at the McGuire home for the 
school summer recess period of June, July and August (R. 73, 74 
and 94). During the same summer months of 1978, the children 
were again with the McGuires in their Jackson home and accompany-
ing their grandparents on trips to and from Ennis, Montana, in 
-4-
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the course of their moving to that state (R. 74, 75 and 100). 
Some time prior to his last Easter 1973, visit wir_h 
Melody and Peter, Appellant had moved to Worland, Wyoming, which 
is 200 to 250 miles northeast of Jackson, where he has resided 
since (R. 131-134). 
Appellant knew that his children were, or had been, in 
Jackson on numerous occasions over the five-year period follow-
ing his final Easter 1973, visit with them (R. 216). His brother, 
Darrell McKinstray, a barber in that town, had seen the children 
"three or four times" during the summers from 197 3 to 19 7 8 (R. 153), 
most recently in 1978 walking in front of his shop and at the 
drugstore (R. 152). Darrell also had heard from others including 
his wife, Candy, that the children were spending summers in 
Jackson (R. 153); Candy McKinstray had been told by one of 
Nadine's friends that the children were in Jackson (R. 157). 
Darrell reported this information to his mother (R. 153). Mrs. 
McKinstray had received word from other Jackson residents as well 
--by her own estimate, as many as ten times over the years in 
question--that her grandchildren had been in town (R. 189, 200, 
203) , and in the course of her usual monthly telephone conversa-
tions with Appellant, she relayed that information to her son 
(R. 191, 201 and 202). Not once during the entire period did 
Appellant ask his mother, or his brother, to inquire about the 
children for him, and his only response to the reports from her 
was "Oh 11 , or "Did you see them? 11 (R. 159, 202 and 208). 
Darrell McKinstray had occasion to see his brother 
-5-
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in Jackson a couple of times a year but didn't mention the child- i 
ren as he knew Appellant didn "t like to talk about them (R. 157 
and 158) . Even during his customary telephone calls to his mother, 
Appellant did not discuss the children with any regularity (R. 202)l 
Appellant testified that while on trips to Jackson, other people 
asked him if he had seen his children, "that they had seen them 
in Jackson" {R. 216), and that a friend, one Robbins, told him he , 
had seen his children at a Shriners' Circus in town (R. 227-228). 
Melody and Peter each testified that they had seen, and 
been recognized by, their McKinstray grandparents and their uncles I 
Darrell McKinstray and Paul McKinstray many times during their 
school vacation visits to Jackson over the summers between 1973 
and 1978, but that the McKinstrays never spoke to them, never 
called to see them or to talk to them at the McGuire home, and 
sent no letters, cards, or birthday presents. Mrs. McGuire's 
testimony confirmed that of the children's in this regard {R. 98, 
99, 100-101, 107, 111-116, 123-125 and 127-128). Nadine also was 
in the company of the children on some of the summer occasions 
when they wer.e seen by Mrs. Mc Kins tray and her son, Darrell (R. 90). 
Appellant testified that his only efforts to locate his 
children after the last 1973 visit with them had been to ncheck 
phone books" in various cities while truck driving (R. 216-217) 
and a single inquiry to a Jackson acquaintance, one Olga Nelson. 
She had no information to give and reacted with "shock" and 
"surprise" that he would ask her instead of the McGuires (R. 218 
and 229). After 1973, and through the summer of 1978, the 
-6-
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McGuires lived in Jackson at the same address Appellant had known 
as their family residence (R. 228). He knew this and had occasion 
to drive by that home with his wife numerous times (R. 17~ and 228). 
Until their removal to Montana in 1978, the McGuires' post office 
box address and telephone number remained the same that Appellant 
had always used to contact Nadine prior to this last 1973 visit 
with the children (R. 148). Appellant testified that he was on 
speaking terms with Mrs. McGuire in 1973 (R. 213); nevertheless, 
after 1973 he chose not to seek information from the McGuires 
concerning the whereabouts of Nadine and the children (R. 98 and 
227) assuming " ... she wouldn't tell me where they were " 
(R. 221). Mrs. McGuire testified that she would have informed 
the McKinstrays of the childrens' summer visits, but "They never 
asked" (R. 104). Since April 1973, neither Nadine nor Mrs. 
McGuire have been contacted by any third person seeking informa-
tion about the children on Appellant's behalf and no cards, letters 
or gifts for the children have been received by either of them 
(R. 75-77, 99 and 101). 
Appellant's explanations for failing to expend any other 
effort than he did to locate and conununicate with his children 
after the Easter 1973, visit were as follows: Three to four 
years after the divorce, his counsel advised letting "Nadine 
calm down a little moren (R. 219); If he didn't pay child support 
he" ... figured in time she [Nadine] would get fed up with it 
and she would she would start something again" (R. 231); and 
nAs time went by I felt that it was better to wait until -- and 
-7-
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let them [Melody and Peter] contact me" (R. 224) c Appellant also 
rejected further legal proceedings as a means of locating the 
children because he " .. had got fed up with the way lawyers 
was handling things and disgusted with the way the Court system 
was working" ( R . 2 2 7 ) . 
Appellant admitted that he has had the ability to pay 
the court-ordered child support throughout the years since 1973 
(R. 137, 138). Due to his total lack of contact or communication 
with his children since that time, he agrees "There's not much 
left" of any relationship between them (R. 224) . Indeed, his 
children do not know him (R. 90) ; neither do they have any love 
or affection for him nor parent-child relationship with him (R. 78) 
The Post-Judgment Motion 
Appellant submitted no affidavits in support of his 
motion to open the judgment on the basis of newly-discovered 
evidence (R. 238) , and Respondents made timely objection to that 
deficiency (R. 239 and 242). Accordingly, Appellant's gratuitous 
recitation in his Statement of Facts of the proposed testimonial 
evidence by Shirley Baldwin is without foundation in the record. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
DENYING APPELLANT'S RULE 52 AND 
59 MOTION TO TAKE ADDITIONAL 
EVIDENCE AND AMEND FINDINGS. 
-8-
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A principle basic to our system of jurisprudence is 
that once a litigant has had his day in court and a judgment has 
been entered,that judgment is to be final and will not be dis-
turbed unless clear and substantial error is shown. Burton v. 
Zions Co-op Mercantile Institution, 122 Utah 360, 249 P.2d 514 (1953) 
With that policy in mind, motions to amend findings and judgments 
or to obtain new trials, are not looked upon with favor. Newbern 
v. Exley Produce Express, 303 P.2d 231, 235 (Ore. 1956). 
The criteria for granting a motion for further evidentiary 
proceedings to amend findings upon the basis of newly-discovered 
evidence has been codified in Rule 59(a) (4) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure: 
Newly discovered evidence, material for 
the party making the application, which he 
could not, with reasonable diligence, have 
discovered and produced at the trial. 
The trial court is permitted wide discretion in ruling 
on such motions, and this Court will not disturb those rulings 
unless it is manifestly clear that the lower court abused its 
discretion or that a miscarriage of justice has occurred. Uptown 
Appliance & Radio Co. v. Flint, 249 P.2d 826 (Utah 1952). However, 
a predicate to the existence of such discretion in the trial court 
to grant a motion such as the one made by Appellant is the showing 
of the requisite statutory grounds. Tangaro v. Marrero, 13 Utah 
2d 290, 373 P.2d 390 (1962). 
The Appellant submitted no affidavits in support of his 
Rule 52 and 59 motion to take newly-discovered evidence as man-
dated by Rule 59(c), U.R.C.P. (R. 238), and Respondents made 
-9-
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timely objection to that statutory deficiency (R. 239 and 242). 
Such affidavits must set out both the proposed testimony and the 
specific circumstances of the movant's efforts to discover and 
produce that evidence prior to trial. Sabin v. Rauch, 255 P.2d 
206 (Ariz. 1952); Fusselman v. Yellowstone Valley Land & Irrigation 
Co., 163 P. 473 (Montana 1917). Accordingly, the trial court was 
invested with no discretion in this matter in the first instance, 
and Appellant's representations that the trial court did not 
require the submission of affidavits is not supported by the 
record. 
Assuming arguendo that the trial court had the discretion 
to consider Appellant's post-judgment motion to hear the "Shirley 
Baldwin" evidence in the absence of the requisite factual showing, 
it did not abuse that discretion in denying to open the judgment 
for the reason that Appellant failed to demonstrate either (1) that 
he had exercised due diligence or (2) that the evidence was so 
substantially material that in all likelihood the court's judgment, 
would have been different. Universal Ins. Co. v. Carpets Inc., 
16 Utah 2d 336, 400 P.2d 564 (1965). 
First, Appellant's witnesses knew of Shirley Baldwin 
(R. 104, 160 and 12 7) . Appellant failed to particularize his 
pre-trial efforts to locate that witness, and we have only his 
conclusory, self-serving statements that diligent attempts were 
made to locate her and that only after trial was she found by 
telephoning her residence in Arizona (R. 240). It is held that 
-in-
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where it appears that the degree of activity or inquiry which led 
to the discovery of a witness or evidence after tial would have 
produced the same evidence had it been exercised prior thereto, 
due diligence has not been exercised. In re Here's Estate, 19 
N.W. 2d 893 (Minn. 1945); 58 AmJur 2d, New Trial, §169, pp. 381-382. 
Apparently, all that was required of Appellant to locate Shirley 
Baldwin was a more earnest telephone search. That being the case, 
he did not exercise the requisite pre-trial diligence. 
Second, the proffered testimonial evidence does not 
suggest the reasonable likelihood of a different result at trial. 
Appellant's counsel candidly admitted at the hearing on his post-
judgment motion that the pivotal issue in the case was whether Mr. 
McKinstray made sufficient efforts over the years in question to 
locate his children. By his own admissions, he made only token 
efforts (R. 216-218 and 229), and the court so found. In light of 
those damaging admissions any conversations Nadine may have had 
with Shirley Baldwin--even if they evidenced Nadine's desire that 
Appellant never visit the children--would not have effected the 
trial court's view of the evidence and ruling that his failure to 
communicate with the children was without good cause or justification. 
Appellant's Rule 52 and 59 motion was properly denied. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT HAS NOT BEEN DENIED DUE 
PROCESS OR EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW. 
Appellant concedes that Point II of his argument is 
" . . a novel one which . may be without merit." Respondents 
agree that it is without merit. 
-11-
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1. Findings regarding credibility of witnesses 
are not necessary. 
This Court has held that findings of a trial court 
sitting without jury should be limited to the ultimate facts to 
be determined, and that they are none the less findings of fact 
because they are drawn as conclusions from other intermediate 
facts. Jankele v. Texas Co., 88 Utah 325, 54 P.2d 425 (1936). 
If the findings follow the allegations of the pleadings, even 
though they are general and limited to the ultimate facts, they 
are sufficient to support the judgment. Pearson v. Pearson, 561 
P.2d 1080 (Utah 1977). 
The trial court's Findings of Fact (R. 35-37) set out 
the essential facts upon which its decree is based, including 
Appellant's ability and failure to pay support over a long period, 
his failure to communicate or maintain a parental relationship 
with his children as a result of minimal or token effort to do so 
without good cause or justification and his manifestation of an 
intent to abandon them. The trial court had to resolve in its 
own mind many intermediate facts to arrive at these ultimate ones. 
J 
\ 
Even tho~gh the court chose not to delineate those many subordinaci 
facts, its announced findings are no less valid or sufficient. 
Respondents are aware of no requirement that a trial 
courtts written findings include findings regarding the credibili~ 
of witnesses. The process of resolving issues of fact obviously 
includes an analysis of the weight to be given contradictory evi- ~ 
dence, the view to be taken of any given evidence in the light oft 
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other evidence and a consideration of the believability of the 
witnesses presenting the evidence. "Credibility'' is not an issue 
to be resolved and found as fact; rather, it is an intangible 
element to be applied by the fact-finder in the process of deciding 
which facts exist. The trial court's determination of which 
witnesses were believable and which witnesses were not are 
implicit in its findings of ultimate facts. 
2. This Court's review standards are not inconsistent 
with trial standards of proof. 
The standard of review applied by this Court to rulings 
on plenary hearings in equity cases is simply stated: unless the 
evidence is clearly insufficient to sustain the findings, or the 
findings are demonstrated to be manifestly against the weight of 
the evidence, they will not be disturbed. Peterson v. Peterson, 
190 P.2d 135 (Utah 1948); Shaw v. Jeppson, 239 P.2d 745 (Utah 1952). 
This appellate standard is applied irrespective of whether the 
burden of proof at trial was that necessary to persuade the trier 
of fact by a "preponderance of the evidence" or by "clear and 
convincing evidence". McMahon v. Tanner, 249 P.2d 502 (Utah 1952); 
Peterson, supra. 
The subtlety of Appellant's suggestion that he has been 
denied due process and equal protection of the law as a result of 
this Court's failure to apply a more strict standard of review to 
cases in which the clear and convincing burden of proof applies 
escapes Respondents. Irrespective of the burden of proof at trial, 
-13-
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the standard is the same on appeal, i.e., the findings will be 
upset only if reasonable minds could not differ in deciding to 
the contrary. Robertson v. Hutchinson, 560 P.2d 1110 (Utah 1977) .. 
\ 
The "reasonable mind" standard is the constant yardstick applied 
by this Court in determining whether the findings of the trier 
of fact are shown by the recorded evidence to be more probable 
than not ("preponderance") or to be beyond probability and clinchec 
in the mind ("clear and convincing") . Greener v. Greener, 212 P. 2c 
194, 204 (Utah 1949). 
POINT III 
APPELLANT HAS NO STANDING TO 
CHALLENGE THE ·SUFFICIENCY OF THE 
EVIDENCE. 
At no point in the proceedings below did Appellant move 
the court for a directed verdict pursuant to Rule SO(a), U.R.C.P. 
Accordingly, he has no standing on appeal to assert the insuffici~ 
of the evidence to support the judgment. 
The law is to the effect that one who 
does not move for a directed verdict generally 
has no standing to urge on appeal that the 
evidence does not support the judgment. How-
ever, an exception exists where plain error 
appears in the record and it would result in 
a miscarriage of justice to affirm the 
judgment. 
Henderson v. Meyer, 533 P.2d 290, 
2 91-9 2 (Utah 19i 
Appellant has not particularized for this Court any "plai 
error" in the record which demonstrates a miscarriage of justice. 
It is mandatory that a litigant argue that his opponent has not 
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established his case as a matter of law via the appropriate motion 
to the trial court. This Appellant did not do. 
POINT IV 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT 
UNDER THE LAW OF THE CASE. 
There is no dispute in this case that Appellant failed 
to pay child support for six and one-half years notwithstanding 
his ability to do so (R. 137 and 138). Neither is it disputed 
that he failed over the same period of time to maintain a parental 
relationship with them. The crucial issues presented are: 
Whether Appellant's lack of communication with his children and 
his failure to expend more effort than he did to locate them was 
without good cause and whether his conduct evidenced an intention 
to abandon them. The trial court found against Appellant on each 
of these issues (R. 36), and those findings are amply supported 
by the evidence. 
The facts regarding Appellant•s efforts after Easter 
1973 to locate his children were not in dispute. He described 
those as being telephone book searches in various cities to which 
he traveled as a long-line truck driver and a single inquiry to a 
Jackson resident who knew Nadine (R. 216-218 and 229). The facts 
pertaining to Appellant's knowledge that the children had been 
with the McGuires in Jackson for many months during the summers 
of 1974 through 1978 while disputed, were not categorically denied 
or contradicted by him. Where evidence in an equity case consists 
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largely of testimony of witnesses, this Court should defer to, 
and rely upon, the trial judge's resolution of conflicts in that 
evidence. Greener, supra. 
Respondents cite the recent case of Adoption of Guzman, 
586 P.2d 418 (Utah 1978) as the best authority in support of the 
trial court's ruling. Guzman was an abandonment action against 
a natural mother. The evidence was that the mother had failed 
to communicate with the children, neither had she sent letters or 
gifts or made calls to them, over a four-year period even though 
the children, their father and step-mother all resided in the 
same county as the mother and their address and telephone number 
were listed in the telephone directory. This Court stated: 
During an interval of approximately 
four years, appellant Anita appears to have 
shown little interest in the children here 
involved and her failure to exercise her 
rights of visitation and in failing to 
cormnunicate or to attempt to communicate 
with the children or with her former 
husband and father of the children and 
his present wife appear sufficient to 
support the court's conclusion that she 
intended to abandon them. (Emphasis added) 
586 P.2d at 419 
While Guzman may be distinguished for the reason that 
those parties and the children all resided in the same county 
and state, the case is analogous for the reason that a telephone 
number and address were available to the non-custodial parent 
at which inquiry could be made regarding the children. Clearly, 
the principle urged by Respondents here is recognized in Guzman: 
a non-custodial parent's failure without good cause to communicate, 
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or attempt to communicate, with his children or show other interest 
in them for the period established in this case, six and one-half 
years (April 1973 to October 1979), justifies a finding of intent 
to abandon. 
Appellant McKinstray knew that his children had been in 
Jackson on numerous occasions over the years 1974 through 1978. 
He also knew that the McGuires continued to reside at the same 
address during that period with the same telephone number he had 
called many times prior to 1974 to arrange visitation. Notwith-
standing, he never requested his mother or any other family member 
to assist in obtaining information regarding the children's where-
abouts, and he consciously failed to avail himself of the most 
obvious and ready source of that information in Jackson: the 
McGuires. 
Appellant's apologies for not pursuing the information 
that would have enabled him to locate his children are legally 
indefensible and morally timorous, viz: upon advice of counsel in 
1973 or 1974 he decided to "let Nadine calm down a little moren 
(R. 219); although he was on speaking terms with Mrs. McGuire, he 
did not inquire of her regarding his children•s address because 
he assumed" ... she wouldn't tell me where they were" (R. 221); 
if he didn't pay the court-ordered support he " ... figured in 
time she would get fed up with it and she would--she would start 
something again" (R. 231); and, nas time went by I felt that it 
was better to wait until--and let them [Melody and Peter] contact 
me" (R. 224). He also refused the available remedy afforded by 
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the Wyoming divorce court as he was "fed up'' with lawyers and 
"disgusteO. with the court system" (R. 227). Clearly, Appellant's 
failure to communicate with his children was the consequence of 
his decision not to do so. He made no good faith attempt to 
locate them for no justifiable reason. 
The most telling revelation of Appellant's intent, 
however, was that given by his own wife who testified that in 
1973 or 1974 during a conversation with her about what he felt 
" . for not having his kids" he said that " ... he didn't 
want any more kids. He didn't want to go through this pain any-
more. He just didn't want no part of it" (R. 171). Appellant's 
decision to abandon Melody and Peter was expressed and unequivocal, 
and over the six-year period between 1973 and 1979 his conduct 
manifested that intent. 
Appellant's argument that the best interests of the 
children is a proper criterion of proof in an abandonment case 
misses the mark. The law of the case is stated in Adoption of 
Maestas, 531 P.2d 492, 494 (Utah 1975) to be that " ... the 
question of the welfare of the child is not material in a judicial 
determination of abandonment." In both the Robertson1 and Hall 2 
cases cited by Appellant, the trial court had found no abandon-
ment and each case was affirmed on appeal. The statements in 
those decisions regarding the "welfare of the children" and 
"anxieties on both sides" were obiter. 
1Robertson v. Hutchinson, 560 P.2d 1110 (Utah 1977). 
2Hall v. Anderson, 562 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1977). 
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The trial court's findings that Appellant failed to 
maintain a parental relationship with his children as a consequence 
of his having made only token effort to do so, without good cause 
or justification, and that he intended to abandon them are amply 
supported by the evidence in the record before this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
This appeal presents the hackneyed case of a discontented 
Defendant in an abandonment action who, troubled at being called 
to account for his indifference to the welfare and love of his 
children, hopes another try will redeem him. The trial court in 
the exercise of its broad discretionary powers denied Appellant's 
motion for that second try. No abuse of discretion in that decision 
has been shown. 
The judgment of the lower court is convincingly confirmed 
by the record. The statements therein of Appellant and his own 
witnesses are the clearest testament to the reality of his deser-
tion of Melody and Peter. Appellant is not, therefore, entitled 
to any relief on this appeal. 
submitted, 
GARY L. PAXTON 
STEWART, YOUNG, PA ON 
220 South 200 East, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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CE'RTTFTGATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 8th day of October, 1980, 
I personally delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Respondents to MELVIN G. LAREW, JR., Attorney 
for Appellant, 345 South State Street, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111. 
GARY L. PAXTON 
' , 
-20-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
